
Q: Immediately after Shabbos you call for a car service to drive you to the airport. The driver is not religious and therefore did not make havdalah. Is it permissible to use him?
The posuk in Va’yikra (10:10) says “U’lhavdil bein hakodesh u’bein hachol,” to separate between the holy and the mundane.
The Rashba derives from this posuk that there is a Biblical obligation to make havdalah at the conclusion of both Shabbos and yom tov.
The Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos (29: 1) derives the obligation of havdalah from sefer Shemos: “Zachor es yom haShabbos l’kadsho,” (20:8) Remember the day of Shabbos to make it holy. The obligation is to remember the Shabbos when it arrives and when it leaves.
According to the Rambam the Biblical obligation to make havdalah is limited to Shabbos only. Havdalah on yom tov is only a rabbinic obligation. The Teshuvas Harosh (klal 11:3) writes that for both Shabbos and yom tov, havdalah is only a Rabbinic obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orech Chaim 299: 10) poskens that it is assur to do work before one makes havdalah.
The Rama cites the Taz, who writes that the prohibition of doing melachah before havdalah is limited to significant work, such as writing and weaving. However, insignificant work, such as lighting candles or carrying from a private domain to a public domain, is permissible even before making havdalah.
The Magen Avrohom brings the Bais Yosef, who questions the reasoning of the differentiation made by the Rama.
The Olas Shabbos attempts to explain the dispute between the Bais Yosef, who limits all melachah before havdalah, and the Taz, who limits only significant melachos.
The Bais Yosef holds that the underlying reason for why melachah is assur before havdalah is because until one makes havdalah, kedushas Shabbos is still present; from a Biblical standpoint, kedushas Shabbos still lingers until after havdalah. Therefore, all melachos that were assur on Shabbos are assur until after havdalah.
The Taz, however, holds that doing work before havdalah is disrespectful to Shabbos and is only Rabbinically assur.
As Rashi in mesechta Shabbos (150b) writes, the purpose of havdalah is to escort the Shabbos as it departs. It is thus disrespectful to be engaged in one’s own personal melachah before escorting the Shabbos on her way.
The Olas Shabbos reasons that doing insignificant unprofessional work before havdalah would not show disrespect and would therefore be permitted.
The Tzitz Eliezer (11:34) writes that it is not necessary to state that the Bais Yosef holds that the reason why melachah is assur is because the kedushah of Shabbos still lingers until havdalah is made, and it is therefore Biblically assur to do any melachah before havdalah .
Rather, he agrees with the Taz that the kedushah of Shabbos terminates at the end of Shabbos, and everyone would therefore agree that from a Biblical standpoint, all melachah is permitted at the end of Shabbos.
Havdalah is a Rabbinic enactment, as Rashi explained, to accompany the Shabbos as it departs, and the point of contention between the Bais Yosef and the Taz is how restrictive the Rabannan were in their enactment. Did they forbid all melachos, just like on Shabbos itself (Bais Yosef) or just significant melachos (Taz)?
The Tzitz Eliezer permits summoning a non-religious taxi driver to take someone to the airport after Shabbos, even when you surely know that the driver has not made havdalah.
Since he doesn’t plan to make havdalah at all, using his services is not considered causing someone to do an aveirah. As proof, he cites the Teshuvas Toras Chesed, who was asked whether it is permissible for the owner of a restaurant to serve food to people who will eat the food without washing netilas yodayim and reciting birchas ha’motzi; does the owner need to be concerned about the issur of lifnei eveir?
The Toras Chesed poskened that giving food to these people is permitted.
He writes that though the Rama (Orech Chaim 163:2) poskens that it is assur to give food to someone who will not wash netilas yodayim, that issur is limited to situations when one is giving the food as a gift.
However, if the patron eating in the food establishment purchases the food he is eating, since he has the prerogative of purchasing the food anyplace he chooses, there would be no issur of lifnei eveir in selling him food. Moreover, the food that is being served is intrinsically mutar; it is the person who is eating this food who needs to do netilas yodayim and make a brachah.
This would not be assur because of lifnei eveir. Similarly, in our case of the taxi driver, there would be no issur of lifnei eveir, since driving a taxi after Shabbos is intrinsically mutar.
The Tzitz Eliezer concludes that all agree that there is no lingering kedushas Shabbos after Shabbos; it is only that the Rabannan wanted people to pay tribute to Shabbos and see it off in a befitting way that they proclaimed that work shouldn’t be done before havdalah.
The Tzitz Eliezer reasons that since the work being done here, in this case driving the automobile, is not intrinsically assur, the issue is only that this work is being done without the person first making havdalah. The taxi driver is personally ignoring a Rabbinical enactment, but since the actual driving at this time is generally permissible, asking the driver to drive would not be considered causing him to do something assur.